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LEARNING FOR 
DECARBONISATION:
START EARLY, CONCENTRATE ON 
PROMISING TECHNOLOGIES, EXPLOIT 
REGIONAL STRENGTH AND WORK 
WITH YOUR NATIONAL SYSTEM
Objective: The Policy Brief makes the case that na-
tional decarbonisation strategies should put a special 
emphasis on the benefits of learning. Accordingly, 
countries should start early to deploy and develop 
low-carbon technologies, concentrate on promising 
technologies, exploit individual regional strength and 
bear in mind the opportunities and constraints of the 
national innovation system.
Early investments to foster learning reduces decarbonisation costs 
in the long term. In addition, early investments into decarbonisation 
technologies also offer economic opportunities for individual coun-
tries to develop new low-carbon technologies and sectors. Learning 
is not only a result of R&D, but also of ‘learning by doing’ effects that 
can follow from increased deployment. Learning rate estimations 
show clearly an advantage of available low-carbon technologies over 
mature “brown” technologies when it comes to electric power gen-
eration. We also find that almost every country has some potential 
to specialise in a particular low-carbon technology and could benefit 
from doing so. Specialisation is necessary, especially for small coun-
tries, as specialisation in all low-carbon technologies at the same time 
is not feasible. Finally, we find that an existing strong sector can fail to 
develop new technologies (electric vehicles in Italy), but also massive 
industrial expansions do not automatically yield the latest technology 
(PV in China). In the end, right policy choices and implementations are 
crucial to foster learning as well as to the creation of a local industry.
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1Introduction
A crucial factor for successful decarbonisation is 
the development of technology which entails, 
both, increasing the efficiency of already availa-
ble technologies in addition to the development 
of new technologies. An example of improving 
eff iciency is batteries for electric cars: better 
technology that engenders cost reductions and 
mass market adoption could pave one significant 
pathway to decarbonise the transport sector. Car-
bon-neutral aeroplanes are an example of a tech-
nology yet to be developed (or at least brought 
to market). Future air mobility would have to be 
reduced dramatically in order to comply with the 
global decarbonisation pathway without a major 
breakthrough in decarbonising aviation, unless 
other technological breakthroughs in the field of 
negative emissions are invented. Thus, the im-
provement and development of low-carbon tech-
nologies is a key requirement to stay on the “well 
below 2°C” / “1.5°C” pathway to decarbonisation. 
These two examples illustrate the double charac-
ter of technology development in the context of 
decarbonisation: decarbonisation is not achieva-
ble without it, followed by drastic changes in the 
economic system. In addition, technology devel-
opment opens up new economic opportunities. 
Regions specialising early in low-carbon technol-
ogies can develop new industries, create jobs and 
reap innovation benefits. 
Climate policies, such as carbon taxes and emission 
standards, are in place to discourage carbon inten-
sive business behaviour. These policies increase 
the cost of “brown industries” that currently rely on 
emitting activities. Increased costs on carbon emis-
sions – that trigger down the value chain – may 
create competitive disadvantage to countries with 
less stringent climate policies. As a result, political 
actors either try to delay aggressive climate policies 
or seek compensation for the most visible “losers”. 
Hence there are, political boundaries that impose 
limits on whether measures to discourage carbon 
emissions can be implemented. 
Policies to promote low carbon technologies, such 
as fiscal incentives for deployment and innovation 
in low carbon technologies allow policy makers to 
highlight that decarbonisation is also an econom-
ic opportunity. The global aim - development of 
competitive low carbon technologies in order to 
allow global decarbonisation; and the national aim 
– development of a competitive edge in some low 
carbon technology segment, are not inconsistent. 
In both cases incentivising learning is essential for 
fostering low carbon industries but learning needs 
time. Innovation and its benefits are uncertain, 
which is why innovation policy needs long com-
mitment and foresight to support skills develop-
ment in strategic areas. 
Against that backdrop, this policy paper aims 
to guide policy makers and practitioners by 
presenting the latest data and evidence in the 
f ield of learning and decarbonisation. The report 
is based on research done for the COP21 RIPPLES 
project. First, we will present to the importance 
of learning, after which we focus on time and 
spatial aspects of learning, before f inally pre-
senting policy options.
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2Learning can 
significantly reduce 
decarbonisation cost 
Over the last decade, the costs of solar PV mod-
ules and wind turbines have declined rapidly 
due to the exploitation of economies of scale, 
“learning by doing” effects and increased R&D 
expenditures.1 Particularly, learning is an ena-
bling factor in enhancing technology diffusion 
and the success of decarbonisation. As argued by 
Peruzzi et al. (2014) learning can be sped up by 
upfront and parallel investments into public R&D 
in clean technologies. This section explores the 
implication of learning rates for the decarbonisa-
tion cost of different low-carbon technologies. It 
uses the POLES model, which addresses learning 
as an endogenous phenomenon.
The crucial question is how accelerated or reduced 
learning rates impact the long-term deployment 
of low-carbon technologies and consequently 
the cost of transition. For this question, we an-
alyse results from sensitivity simulations carried 
out with the POLES model.2 We essentially test, 
how the costs of decarbonisation change, when 
policies enacted increase or decrease the speed 
of learning by 50% compared to the reference 
scenario (2DS3). Learning thereby is defined as 
the reduction in technology cost due to its de-
ployment. That is, if the global capacity of wind 
turbines is doubled, the 2DS scenario expects the 
cost of wind turbines to decrease by 40% in 2050 
compared to the current value – while in the “fast 
learning” scenario they would decrease by 70% 
and in the “slow learning” scenario only by 30%.
“Fast learning” lowers the deployment cost and 
increases the competitiveness of corresponding 
technologies. “Slow learning” prevents the deploy-
ment of green technologies and increases the du-
ration of the transition. The impact of different 
learning rates is marginal at the beginning of the 
period, but then accelerates between 2030 and 
2050. At the end of the period wind represents 51% 
and solar PV 12% of global electricity generation in 
the “fast learning” scenario. By 2050, wind technol-
ogies will approach their potential limits and will 
feature only low additional cost reductions, while 
solar technologies continue to increase their role 
(see Figure 1).
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Source: POLES, COP21 RIPPLES
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Figure 1. Role of wind and solar in the total world generation
Share of wind + solar in the total generation
1 This section is mainly based on work conducted by Silvana Mima 
from Université Grenoble Alpes.
2 We assume that average learning rate of four different renewable 
energy technologies (on-shore wind power, off-shore wind power, 
photovoltaics and concentrated solar power) vary from -/+50 % of 
those in the RIPPLES 2DS scenario. Comparing these two sensitivity 
scenarios with climate policy 2DS scenario reduce considerably the 
complexity of the analysis. These sensitivity cases are solved for 
scenarios with the following abbreviated labels: Fast learning and 
Slow learning.
3 2DS is the COP21 RIPPLES reference scenario for achieving the 
target of the Paris Agreement to contain global warming to below 
2°C above preindustrial levels.
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The costs of the decarbonisation of the energy 
system increase in the long run, particularly in the 
“slow learning” scenario (Figure 2) and only begin 
to stabilise in 2050. In the “fast learning” scenario 
the decarbonisation cost will be about 19% lower 
than in the 2DS decarbonisation scenario. In the 
“slow learning” scenario the decarbonisation cost 
will be 17% higher. Thus, the current uncertain fu-
ture learning rates of only two technologies can 
have a very substantial impact on the overall cost 
of decarbonisation.
Learning itself does not only depend on the learn-
ing rate, but also on the decarbonisation scenario. 
Scenarios are explored on a standard mitigation 
policy compatible with the Paris targets and cover 
a wide variety of cost patterns compatible with 
any reasonable cost futures. An early and fast de-
ployment of technologies, for example, generates 
much more and early learning. 
Using model insights, we show that the learn-
ing process, which is integrated in all technol-
ogies but with varying intensity particularly for 
new and renewable energy technologies, has a 
crucial role in limiting the costs of mitigation 
policies in the very long run. Thanks to learning 
effects, ambitious stabilisation targets (2DS) 
can be met with lower cost increases for the 
energy sector. 
3Early investments and 
the predictability of 
technological change
The effects of technological change are so ubiq-
uitous in modern societies that they often are 
hard to appreciate.4  Radically new technologies 
appear and displace older ones; incremental but 
sustained innovation in existing technologies 
makes them cheaper and more convenient; and 
new uses are discovered over time. As a result, 
predicting technological progress to help policy 
design is a very difficult problem. However, re-
cent work has shown that for many technologies, 
performance-adjusted real costs decline at an ap-
proximately constant rate for several decades. A 
well-known example of such a trend is Moore’s 
law, which broadly predicted that the cost of sem-
iconductors would halve every 18-24 months. An 
important point, however, is that the rate of these 
cost reductions varies greatly between technolo-
gies. The impressive technological progress rate in 
semiconductors contrasts with much slower rates 
in other products, for instance minerals and other 
commodities.
Once a technology-specific rate of improvement 
has been calculated, it can be used to make quan-
titative, empirically validated forecasts, where a 
range of likely technology cost values are given as 
a function of the forecast horizon. This approach 
does not explain why technological progress oc-
curs, it simply gives future cost ranges based on 
limited past observations of a technology’s rate of 
progress and its volatility. In contrast, a large litera-
ture has focused on explaining these trends using 
“experience”: instead of being based on the passing 
of , cost forecasts are made based on the accumu-
lation of , i.e. cumulative effort expended on the ac-
tivity, such as cumulative production, cumulative 
electricity generated, cumulative investment etc. 
Research has shown that, because production and 
experience both tend to grow exponentially, fore-
casts made based on time alone are approximately 
as good as those made conditional on experience. 
This means that under business-as-usual scenari-
os, simple time series can be used to forecast tech-Fast learning2DSSlow learning
Source: POLES, COP21 RIPPLES
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Figure 2. Annual abatement cost 
of decarbonisation scenarios 
with different learning rates for wind and solar PV
4 This section is mainly based on work conducted by Rupert Way 
from Oxford University.
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nological progress. However, when attempting to 
forecast future technological performance in “alter-
native” scenarios (i.e. business-as-usual), experience 
curves are more reliable.
The causes of cost reductions are varied and nu-
merous, but in general they result from the grad-
ual accumulation of knowledge and expertise at 
various stages of the production process (science, 
R&D, manufacturing, commerce, organisation). Un-
doubtedly, innovation is a complex process and also 
sometimes occurs independently of experience, 
but broadly speaking, applying more effort is likely 
to lead to more progress. In addition, advances are 
cumulative: once a useful skill or technique has been 
learned, it becomes adopted widely by the produc-
tion system and is not easily forgotten. Thus, learn-
ing is largely a purposeful and one-way process in 
which the total stock of knowledge keeps growing 
and grows faster the more effort is made. The ex-
perience curve concept is a simple way to model 
this process: more effort invested helps reduce costs 
faster, although with some degree of uncertainty.
Importantly, not all technologies respond to effort 
in the same way. The manufacturing of solar pho-
tovoltaic panels, for instance, appears to have a fair-
ly high “learning rate”: more effort translates into 
significant cost reductions. For other technologies, 
such as biomass electricity, it takes much more 
effort to achieve similar cost reductions. In a few 
cases, it is not clear that more effort translates into 
lower costs at all; in nuclear energy the cost trend 
is upwards. This happens because industry, govern-
ment and consumers not only learn how to per-
form various tasks more efficiently, they also learn 
more about risks associated with technologies, 
which can lead to new safety standards, regulations 
and changes in public opinion (for good or ill).
Our analysis of experience curves for a range of 
technologies suggests that early investments in 
low-carbon energy technologies are very appeal-
ing. These technologies tend to have high learning 
rates, and their deployment is still very limited, so 
that a bit more effort is likely to translate into signif-
icant cost reductions. While they are already com-
petitive in good locations, accelerating progress 
along the experience curve can make these tech-
nologies affordable in more and more locations in 
the short to medium run, depending on local con-
ditions and broader energy systems considerations.
Figure 3 shows how probabilistic cost forecasts for 
solar, wind and battery technologies are affected 
by following a low-growth path (“business-as-usu-
al”, 10% annual growth) versus a high-growth path 
(“accelerated growth”, 30% annual growth). After 
10 years median cost forecasts are 57$/MWh for so-
lar, 55$/MWh for wind and 129$/kWh for batteries 
For solar, wind, gas and coal, "cumulative electricity" refers to global electricity generation; for batteries it refers to global electricity storage capacity 
produced. For solar, wind, gas and coal, cost is Levelized Cost Of Electricity, 2017$/MWh; for batteries it is cost per unit of electricity storage capacity, 
2017$/kWh. Data: IEA, EIA, BNEF, BP, Lazard, Schilling & Esmundo 2009, Wiser et al. 2016, Schmidt et al. 2017, McNerney et al. 2011, Colpier & Cornland 2002.
Start year End year
Historical data
10 year business-as-usual forecast
10 year accelerated growth forecast
Source: POLES, COP21 RIPPLES
SOLAR PV 1990-2017 
(global average, Li-ion)
BATTERIES 1995-2017
(US average)
GAS 1990-2016
(US average)
COAL 1960-2017 
(global average, onshore)
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(global average)
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Figure 3. Experience curves for selected energy technologies
Cost per unit of electricity ($)
Cost per unit of electricity ($)
Cumulative 
electricity (TWh)0.001 0.01 0.1 1 10 100 1000 10000 100000
with 10-year forecasts (95% conﬁdence intervals) in two scenarios
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in the low-growth case and 47$/MWh, 48$/MWh, 
94$/kWh (respectively) in the accelerated case. 
Importantly though, the 95% confidence intervals 
are also narrower in the accelerated scenario.
As well as the direct benefits of cost reductions, early 
support is useful for at least two other reasons. First, 
lower costs allow innovators to explore new areas 
of the technology landscape, opening up previous-
ly-inaccessible applications and leading to positive 
feedback. For example, recent cost reductions in 
solar PV and batteries are creating new possibilities 
for peer-to-peer energy trading, vehicle-to-grid ap-
plications, and even replacing new-build gas power 
stations. Second, increasing early stage experience 
generates valuable new data about the experience 
curve for a particular technology, allowing more ac-
curate forecasts of its likely future prospects, based 
on its own unique learning system.
Determining which technologies will benefit most 
from early support depends on both the slope of 
experience curves and how much progress has 
already been made. Progress is much easier for 
young technologies. Each new kWh generated by 
a solar panel, or used to power an electric vehi-
cle, reflects a much larger contribution to relative 
experience than one generated by a gas power 
station. The latter involves simply repeating many 
well-known, already highly optimised steps, while 
the former involves building new systems, innovat-
ing, implementing new processes etc., and at each 
stage there are new opportunities for optimisation 
and efficiency increases. 
Another key point is that there are opportunity 
costs in investing in high-carbon technologies. Be-
cause many energy technologies are substitutable, 
continuing to invest in high-carbon technologies 
means not investing in renewable energy technolo-
gies, and therefore directly  learning and innovating 
towards a low-cost, clean energy system. In contrast 
to young technologies (solar, wind, batteries, elec-
tric vehicles etc.), technologies that have already 
accumulated vast amounts of experience (coal, oil, 
gas, nuclear, hydro) are not likely to experience sig-
nificant progress in future.
Finally, each of these technologies relies on other 
technologies, and is useful for other technologies. 
This means that investing in certain technologies 
provides higher overall system-level benefits than 
investing in others. This is a topic of current re-
search, but early results have suggested that clean 
energy technologies provide higher system bene-
fits than “brown” technologies.
In summary, global experience in solar, wind, bat-
teries and the network of related hi-tech, low-car-
bon technologies is currently very small, and poli-
cies that increase experience in these technologies 
are likely to contribute to lowering their average 
costs  equivalent fossil fuel energy costs in the long-
run, due to the one-way accumulation of knowl-
edge. The speed at which these lower costs can 
be accessed depends on the timing and the scale 
of support. The faster experience is increased, the 
greater the chance of achieving lower costs sooner.
4Specialisation is crucial
As argued above, timing and technology choice 
is crucial for the development of low-carbon 
technologies.5 As the development of technolo-
gies takes time, early investment decisions have 
long-lasting impacts. Similarly, learning has an im-
portant spatial dimension as countries (and even 
regions) differ in their preconditions to specialise 
in certain technologies. 
Following the theory of revealed comparative ad-
vantage, every country has a set of technologies 
it can relatively specialise in. A country’s strength 
in a technology can be measured by its success of 
exporting and patenting in that technology. Larg-
er countries tend to export and patent more, but, 
the relative export/patent strength of a country 
in each technology reveals information about the 
underlying comparative advantages of the coun-
try in the individual technologies. For example, if 
one of two otherwise similar countries exports ten 
times as many solar panels than wind turbines, 
while another one exports ten times as many wind 
turbines as solar panels, the first one appears to 
exhibit a comparative advantage in solar panels 
while the second one in wind turbines. 
To address this size-effect we assess a country’s rel-
ative strength in a technology with two measures: 
revealed comparative advantage based on gross 
exports (RCA) and the revealed technological ad-
vantage based on patenting numbers (RTA). The 
revealed advantage in a technology of a country is 
defined by a fraction of two shares. For the RCA, the 
technology’s share of export on total exports of that 
5 This section is mainly based on work conducted by Alexander Roth 
and Georg Zachmann from Bruegel. Research assistance from 
Enrico Bergamini is gratefully acknowledged.
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country is divided by the global export share that the 
technology exhibits worldwide (sum of worldwide 
export of that technology divided by the sum of all 
worldwide exports). The same methodology is used 
to calculate the RTA using patents counts instead 
of gross exports.6 We focus on a choice of fourteen 
low-carbon technologies7 and 46 countries8. 
Current export specialisation
Almost all countries are specialised in exporting 
at least one of the 14 low carbon technologies. In 
fact, only three countries (Australia, Norway and 
Malta) are not specialised (RCA<0.5) in exporting 
any of the low-carbon product categories. How-
ever, 28 countries do not export at all in at least 
one of the 14 product categories. Larger countries 
exhibit average specialisations in most of the 
categories, while smaller countries have more 
pronounced strengths and weaknesses. Current-
ly, the countries that have the most low-carbon 
products with export advantage are France, 
Germany, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland. Never-
theless, as depicted in Figure 4, for almost every 
country there exists a low carbon technology it 
is particularly highly specialised in, and another 
one it is particularly unspecialised in. 
Certain low-carbon products show a pattern of 
strong concentration in few countries, such as 
nuclear power within Canada, Czech Republic, 
France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Russia, 
and Sweden having above average export spe-
cialisation. Other products, such as eff icient 
heating and cooling, eff icient combustion tech-
nologies, and insulation products are much more 
widespread over many countries. That has most 
likely to do with the technological complexity 
involved in producing these products. While the 
production of products for nuclear power plants 
involves in itself a lot of sophisticated technol-
ogies, thus the entry barrier for companies is 
high, other low-carbon technologies allow easier 
access for newcomers and thus a wider spread 
over several countries. 
Current patenting specialisation
Of the total 46 countries, 32, mainly smaller coun-
tries, have an RTA of exactly zero in at least one of 
the low-carbon technologies as no patent activity 
is recorded in that particular technology group 
for the covered time period. Overall, we see that 
large countries (for instance Germany, France, 
US, China, Japan) exhibit average specialisation 
in most technology groups whereas many small-
er countries specialise only in a few technologies. 
6 We standardise both measures to make sure they are between 0 
(not specialised) and 1 (only country that is active at this technology). 
Thereby 0.5 is the level, at which a country is as specialised in a 
certain technology, as the average country.
7 The technology selection consists of batteries, biofuels, efficient 
combustion, electric vehicles, energy management, heating and 
cooling, hydropower, insulation, lighting, nuclear, rail, solar PV, solar 
thermal and wind.
8 Countries are all G20 and EU28 countries as well as Iceland, Norway, 
Switzerland and Israel.
Note: the blue bar shows the range of countries that is not among the 25% most and 25% least specialised is this technology.
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Source: Bruegel, COP21 RIPPLES
Figure 4. Export specialisation of four countries in seven low carbon technologies (RCA)
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In Figure 5, the selected sample illustrates that 
most countries are, both, particularly specialised 
in one and particularly unspecialised in another 
technology. In many cases these patent specialisa-
tions coincide with export specialisations (e.g., bio-
fuels for Brazil or wind for Germany) – but notably 
in the case of China, patent specialisation for solar 
PV and wind lacks behind export specialisation9.
Potential specialisation
Using trade and patent data, we can not only 
calculate the current comparative advantage of 
each country in a certain technology, but we can 
also try to estimate a country’s potential. We base 
our analysis on systematic evidence originating 
from the regional growth literature triggered by 
Hidalgo et al. (2007), which found that countries 
diversify into industries that are closely related to 
current exports. Similarly, we infer a county’s po-
tential trade and innovation strength by assessing 
the strength in closely related technologies.
Overall, the strength of exporting and patenting in 
low carbon technologies, as well as the strength of 
the same countries in nearby technologies exports 
and patents paints a relatively consistent picture. 
This indicates that there are strong geographic 
specialisation trends in low carbon technologies, 
which countries should try to exploit and not (un-
needed) try to counteract.
5Technology and 
Industrial policy for low 
carbon technology: 
Juggling political 
commitment, skills 
development and 
finance
Different countries have different potential to de-
velop different low carbon technologies.10 Thereby, 
preconditions such as the deployment potential, 
technology proximity to existing technological 
strength, technology potential and access to ex-
port markets can inform choices about which 
technological developments a country might 
want to politically support.
In four case studies (Brazil, South Africa, China and 
Italy) we find that the main challenge in design-
ing low-carbon industrial and technology policy 
is to tilt the incumbent domestic system to allow 
for effectively supporting these emerging sectors. 
Both in the low-carbon transport sector and in the 
renewables electricity sector, countries with strong 
Note: the blue bar shows the range of countries that is not among the 25% most and 25% least specialised is this technology.
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Figure 5. Patent specialisation of four countries in seven low carbon technologies (RTA)
9 The correlation of RTA and RCA was about 40%.
10 This section is mainly based on work conducted by Britta 
Rennkamp from Cape Town University. With input from several 
project partners (ENEA, Tsinghua, COPPE).
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potential in low-carbon technologies also feature 
strong incumbent rivals. Examples are the Italian 
car industry, the South African concentrated solar 
power (CSP) sector and the Brazilian wind power 
sector. At the same time, there is competition and 
growing domestic demand for skills, which need to 
be built up in long term efforts and require strate-
gic support of a larger supporting innovation sys-
tem. Sustained domestic funding and international 
investments are essential to sustain skills develop-
ment and the evolution of technological capabil-
ity. Yet, sustaining a financial basis for low-carbon 
technology diffusion has proven very difficult for 
middle income countries with constrained public 
funds and ‘bumpy’ investment climates. 
The comparative case study of local content re-
quirements in the Brazilian and South African 
wind energy programmes has revealed once again 
the contested incentives that aim at enhancing 
technological and industrial development, while 
simultaneously posing trade barriers. The Brazil-
ian programme has created jobs in manufactur-
ing, installation, operation and maintenance while 
achieving highly competitive energy prices through 
a competitive auction system. The South African 
government has attracted significant investment 
in the wind sector but has not yet stabilised the 
renewable energy programme to create a reliable 
investment climate. Requiring compliance with 
local content requirements from international in-
vestors comes with the commitment to support of 
the industry and its investors, as the Brazilian case 
demonstrates. The Brazilian wind energy industry 
could build on an existing base in a combination 
of committed investors and an aviation industry 
in combination with a clear financial incentive to 
compliance and penalising non-compliance. The 
South African case has demonstrated that the lack 
of support of the industry in combination with 
lacking political commitment to a renewable en-
ergy programme has created significant trade-offs 
between quality, timelines, skills development and 
ability to comply with industrial development. 
Technology leadership and local 
value-added needs more than low 
production cost
The case study about the Chinese PV sector shows 
that large gaps remain between Chinese PV tech-
nology and the most advanced technology at the 
international level, despite the advantage of scale, 
in markets within and without China. China’s recent 
explosive growth in installed capacity of renewable 
energy was accompanied by an increasing demand 
for professional skills, which are not available from 
the Chinese innovation and training system. Most 
of the technology gaps are not only in design and 
manufacturing within the PV industry, but more 
importantly can be found in the upstream indus-
try of material and basic industry. Similar to the 
experience in South Africa and Brazil, the Chinese 
renewable energy sector, intensive in technology 
and capital, requires a wide array of skills besides 
investment. The renewable energy industry strug-
gles with a lack of skills in design, manufacturing, 
installation, commissioning and operational man-
agement. The lack of skills meets a tough environ-
ment for finance. Despite the growth of support-
ing industries in recent years, the relatively small 
capital size as well as substantial difficulties in loan 
financing have restricted the sustainable develop-
ment of renewable energy enterprises in China.
The challenge of finance and skills also became 
evident in the case study of CSP technologies in 
South Africa and electric vehicles in Italy. These 
case studies also demonstrated the importance 
of the global technological and financial dynam-
ics and their impacts on the ability for low car-
bon technology to evolve. The South African CSP 
programme is part of a larger renewable energy 
programme, which focuses on funding renewable 
energy projects via competitive bidding. The case 
of CSP is different from the wind and PV projects 
under the project, as it centres around a largely in-
ternationally funded innovation system, with a re-
search centre on CSP at its core. As a result, South 
Africa is developing a comparative advantage in 
three CSP-related technologies, namely heliostats, 
air-cooled condensers and packed (rock) bed 
thermal energy storage. These developments are 
largely due to steady investments over the last 
decades, largely from public funds but also with 
increasing private sector participation. South Afri-
ca has recently made large investments in the de-
ployment of utility scale CSP in South Africa. This 
has yet to drive CSP innovation. Improved strategic 
stability in the utility scale CSP programme and 
clearer commitment to the programme could im-
prove this situation. Further evolution of the three 
technologies have a favourable chance of success 
in global supply chains, if the funding continues. 
The case study about the Italian car industry at-
tempts to understand its slow development of 
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electric vehicle manufacturing compared to its 
competitors in Asia and Europe. Italy has a com-
petitive automotive industry to start from, but the 
competitive advantages in innovating in internal 
combustion engines may become obsolete and 
disappear. Countering risks such as job and industry 
losses require to strengthen first the research base 
and the training (and re-training) of the workforce 
so that it is ready and capable to respond to private 
investment, as well as to support some of the most 
competitive national enterprises. To be a significant 
player in crucial areas such as battery manufactur-
ing, large investments would be required.
In sum, strategic support of low carbon technology 
development needs to meet with political commit-
ment. Skills development requires long term edu-
cational strategies in support of innovation systems 
for renewable and alternative energy technology. 
6Conclusion
This policy briefs argues that early investments to 
foster learning reduces decarbonisation costs in 
the long term. In addition, early investments into 
decarbonisation technologies also offer economic 
opportunities for individual countries to develop 
new low-carbon technologies and sectors. Learning 
is not only a result of R&D, but also of ‘learning by 
doing’ effects that can follow from increased de-
ployment. Learning rate estimations show clearly 
an advantage of available low-carbon technologies 
over mature “brown” technologies when it comes to 
electric power generation. We also find that almost 
every country has some potential to specialise in a 
particular low-carbon technology and could benefit 
from doing so. Specialisation is necessary, especially 
for small countries, as specialisation in all low-carbon 
technologies at the same time is not feasible. Final-
ly, we find that an existing strong sector can fail to 
develop new technologies (electric vehicles in Italy), 
but also massive industrial expansions do not auto-
matically yield the latest technology (PV in China). In 
the end, right policy choices and implementations 
(see local content requirements for wind energy in 
Brazil and South Africa) are crucial to foster learning 
as well as to the creation of a local industry.
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